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 PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 17-2901 
_______________ 
 
PABLO ANTONIO MEJIA-CASTANON, 
    Petitioner 
   
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
_______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Case No. A206-033-430) 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Steven A. Morley 
 
_______________ 
 
Argued: May 30, 2018 
 
Before: AMBRO, SCIRICA, and SILER, JR.,  
Circuit Judges. 
 
                                              
 Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr., United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
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(Opinion Filed:  July 25, 2019) 
 
Theodore J. Murphy [ARGUED] 
Murphy Law Firm 
320 North High Street 
West Chester, PA 19380 
Counsel for Petitioner 
 
Chad A. Readler  
Anthony P. Nicastro 
Dana M. Camilleri 
Sabatino F. Leo [ARGUED] 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
 Counsel for Respondent 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
  Aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States 
and ordered removed may apply for cancellation of that 
removal if they, among other things, have maintained a 
continuous physical presence in the United States for at least 
ten years and have been a person of good moral character for 
such period. Congress modified the calculation of the physical 
presence requirement when it amended the Immigration and 
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Nationality Act in 1996: Under the “stop-time rule,” the 
physical presence period ends when the Department of 
Homeland Security serves the alien with a notice to appear.1 
As a result, aliens cannot continue to accrue physical presence 
time during the pendency of (often lengthy) removal 
proceedings and appeals. At issue is whether the stop-time rule 
applies to the time period during which an alien must exhibit 
good moral character.  
 
Petitioner Pablo Antonio Mejia-Castanon maintains 
that it does, such that events occurring after the service of a 
notice to appear cannot be used to evaluate his good moral 
character. This time distinction is critical to Petitioner’s 
application for cancellation of removal because he admitted to 
helping family members illegally enter the United States 
during the pendency of his application, a transgression that 
indisputably undermines his ability to demonstrate good moral 
character. Under Petitioner’s interpretation, the stop-time rule 
operates to exclude these events from the evaluation of his 
moral character. But if the stop-time rule does not truncate the 
good moral character window, he will not satisfy the good 
moral character requirement and will be statutorily ineligible 
for cancellation of removal.  
 
 The Board of Immigration Appeals rejected 
Petitioner’s reading of the statute, and two courts of appeals 
have deferred to the Board’s interpretation under Chevron. For 
                                              
1  While this case was pending, the Supreme Court issued 
a decision clarifying what is required of such a notice to appear. 
See Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018). Pereira has 
important consequences for the stop-time rule, which we 
discuss below. See infra Section I.B.2. 
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the reasons that follow, we agree with our sister circuits and 
hold that the Board’s interpretation is entitled to Chevron 
deference. Under that interpretation, the stop-time rule does 
not apply to the good moral character requirement. Instead, the 
relevant time period on which to evaluate an alien’s good moral 
character is the ten-year period prior to the final administrative 
decision on an alien’s application for cancellation of removal. 
We will deny the petition. 
 
I. 
 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 
U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., an alien who enters the United States 
without permission, and who is not admitted or paroled, is 
removable. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), 1227(a)(1)(A). 
The Department of Homeland Security may remove such an 
alien by initiating removal proceedings before an Immigration 
Judge, see id. § 1229a, and providing written notice to the alien 
by serving him with a “notice to appear,” id. § 1229(a)(1). The 
notice to appear informs the alien, among other things, of the 
“time and place” of the removal hearing, the “legal authority 
under which the proceedings are conducted,” and the “charges 
against the alien.” Id. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i), (B), (D). An alien 
served with a notice to appear may challenge his removal on 
the merits or admit his removability while seeking certain 
discretionary relief.  
 
A. 
Prior to amendments in 1996, one type of discretionary 
relief an alien could seek was suspension of deportation. The 
INA provided that “the Attorney General may, in his 
discretion, suspend deportation” of an alien if he (1) had “been 
 5 
 
physically present in the United States for a continuous period 
of not less than seven years immediately preceding the date of 
such application;” (2) “prove[d] that during all of such period 
he was and is a person of good moral character;” and (3) was 
“a person whose deportation would . . . result in extreme 
hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a 
citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994); see also 
I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 923–24 (1983). “Even if these 
prerequisites [we]re satisfied,” however, “it remain[ed] in the 
discretion of the Attorney General to suspend, or refuse to 
suspend, deportation.” I.N.S. v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 446 
(1985) (citations omitted). 
 
Under this pre-1996 formulation, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals interpreted the physical presence and 
good moral character time periods to be identical. See In re 
Ortega-Cabrera, 23 I. & N. Dec. 793, 794 (B.I.A. 2005) 
(citations omitted). And because the Board construed “such 
application” in the phrase “immediately preceding the date of 
such application,” 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994), to be “a 
continuing one,” the seven-year time period for both 
“continu[ed] to accrue” through the Board’s final 
administrative decision on an alien’s application for 
cancellation of removal. Ortega-Cabrera, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 
794. In other words, an alien could accrue the required seven 
years of physical presence during the pendency of her removal 
proceedings and appeals, and her moral character would also 
be evaluated until the final adjudication of her application.  
 
This statutory structure was problematic, however, 
because it created a “substantial incentive” for those aliens 
facing deportation “to prolong litigation” and to “stall[ ] 
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physical departure in the hope of eventually satisfying” the 
seven-year requirement. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. at 450. 
Congress believed suspension of deportation was being abused 
and exploited, particularly by aliens seeking to “accrue time 
toward the seven year threshold even after they ha[d] been 
placed in deportation proceedings.” H.R. Rep. 104-469, at 122 
(1996); see also In re Cisneros, 23 I. & N. Dec. 668, 670 
(B.I.A. 2004) (“[A]liens in deportation proceedings had 
knowingly filed meritless applications for relief or otherwise 
exploited administrative delays in the hearing and appeal 
process in order to ‘buy time,’ during which they could acquire 
a period of continuous presence that would qualify them for 
forms of relief that were unavailable to them when proceedings 
were initiated.”). Congress also believed the “‘extreme 
hardship’ standard”—the final statutory requirement for 
suspension of deportation––“ha[d] been weakened by recent 
administrative decisions.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 213 
(1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
 
B. 
To address these concerns, Congress passed the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (IIRIRA). See Pub. L. No. 104–208, Div. C, Tit. III, 
Subtit. A, sec. 304(a)(3), § 240A, 110 Stat. 3009-594 to 3009-
596. Relevant here, IIRIRA amended the INA to its current 
form by replacing suspension of deportation with a new and 
more limited form of relief called “cancellation of removal.” 
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b; see also H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 213 
(1996) (Conf. Rep.). And IIRIRA created the stop-time rule, 
designed to prevent an alien from accruing physical presence 
time during the pendency of immigration proceedings.  
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1. 
IIRIRA introduced significant differences for aliens 
seeking relief from removal: Congress extended the length of 
time required for an alien to be physically present from seven 
to ten years, excluded from eligibility those aliens who were 
convicted of certain offenses under the INA, and strengthened 
the hardship requirement from “extreme hardship” to an 
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” Compare 8 
U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994) (repealed), with 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(b)(1)(A)–(D). See also H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 213 
(1996) (Conf. Rep.) (“The managers have deliberately changed 
the required showing of hardship from ‘extreme hardship’ to 
‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ to emphasize 
that the alien must provide evidence of harm to his spouse, 
parent, or child substantially beyond that which ordinarily 
would be expected to result from the alien’s deportation.”). 
 
Under current law as adopted in IIRIRA, to be eligible 
for cancellation of removal an alien must: (1) have “been 
physically present in the United States for a continuous period 
of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of 
such application;” (2) have “been a person of good moral 
character during such period;” (3) have “not been convicted” 
of certain offenses under the INA, including crimes involving 
moral turpitude, certain felonies, and document fraud; and (4) 
must “establish[ ] that removal would result in exceptional and 
extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or 
child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. 
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§ 1229b(b)(1)(A)–(D) (emphasis added).2 If an alien satisfies 
these four requirements, an Immigration Judge may grant 
cancellation of removal after balancing “the favorable and 
adverse factors” of the alien’s particular case. In re A-M-, 25 I. 
& N. Dec. 66, 76 (B.I.A. 2009).  
 
2. 
To eliminate the incentive to delay immigration 
proceedings to accrue physical presence time, IIRIRA created 
the stop-time rule in a separate subsection titled “Special rules 
relating to continuous residence or physical presence.” 8 
U.S.C. § 1229b(d). Relevant here, the stop-time rule provides, 
“[f]or the purposes of [cancellation of removal]” an alien’s 
period of continuous physical presence “shall be deemed to 
end . . . when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 
1229(a).” Id. § 1229b(d)(1).  
 
The stop-time rule is only triggered upon service of a 
notice to appear “that, at the very least, ‘specif[ies]’ the ‘time 
and place’ of the removal proceedings.” Pereira v. Sessions, 
138 S. Ct. 2105, 2114 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 
1229(a)(1)(G)(i)) (alteration in original). Prior to Pereira, a 
number of other courts of appeals had adopted a Board 
interpretation finding § 1229b(d)(1) “does not impose 
substantive requirements” on notices to appear. In re 
Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644, 647 (B.I.A. 2011).3 Pereira 
                                              
2  IIRIRA also prohibits the Attorney General from 
cancelling the removal of more than 4,000 aliens in a single 
fiscal year. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(e)(1).  
3  For courts of appeals’ decisions deferring to the Board’s 
interpretation under Chevron, see: Moscoso-Castellanos v. 
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dispatched with this understanding, characterizing § 
1229(a)(1) as a definitional provision establishing hearing time 
and place among the minimum contents needed for a notice to 
appear to trigger the stop-time rule. 
 
In sum, if an alien is served with a notice to appear prior 
to accruing sufficient physical presence time, he cannot satisfy 
the physical presence requirement––and is therefore ineligible 
for cancellation of removal––no matter how long his 
immigration proceedings continue. Service of a notice to 
appear that fails to set a hearing time and place does not trigger 
the stop-time rule.4 
 
 
 
                                              
Lynch, 803 F.3d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir. 2015); O'Garro v. Att’y 
Gen., 605 F. App’x 951, 953 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); 
Guaman-Yuqui v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 235, 239–40 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(per curiam); Gonzalez-Garcia v. Holder, 770 F.3d 431, 434–
35 (6th Cir. 2014); Yi Di Wang v. Holder, 759 F.3d 670, 674–
75 (7th Cir. 2014); and Urbina v. Holder, 745 F.3d 736, 740 
(4th Cir. 2014). We diverged from this consensus, maintaining 
before Pereira that a notice to appear “that fails to satisfy § 
1229(a)(1)’s various requirements” does not trigger the stop-
time rule. Orozco-Velasquez v. Att’y Gen., 817 F.3d 78, 83 (3d 
Cir. 2016). 
4  Pereira leaves open whether the stop-time rule is 
triggered when an incomplete notice to appear is followed by 
a subsequent notice setting a hearing time and place. As we 
note below, this case does not demand an answer to that 
question.  
 10 
 
C. 
 To be eligible for cancellation of removal, an alien also 
must have “been a person of good moral character” during a 
continuous ten-year period. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B). Under 
the INA, “[n]o person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a 
person of good moral character who,” during the relevant time 
period satisfies any of a lengthy list of prohibited conduct. 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(f); see also id. § 1101(f)(1)–(9). The list 
includes, for example, being “a habitual drunkard,” id. 
§ 1101(f)(1), deriving income “principally from illegal 
gambling activities,” id. § 1101(f)(4), and giving false 
testimony to gain immigration benefits, id. § 1101(f)(6). 
Relevant here, an alien is not a person of good moral character 
if he engaged in alien smuggling activities. Id. § 1101(f)(3).5   
 
II. 
A. 
Petitioner Pablo Antonio Mejia-Castanon is a citizen of 
Guatemala who entered the United States without permission 
in 2002. Years later, the Department of Homeland Security 
                                              
5  Section 1101(f)(3) provides that an alien is not a person 
of good moral character if he is “a member of one or more of 
the classes of persons, whether inadmissible or not, described 
in paragraph[ ] . . . (6)(E) . . . of section 1182(a)” of the INA. 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3). Paragraph (6)(E), titled “Smugglers,”  
provides in part that “[a]ny alien who at any time knowingly 
has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other 
alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of 
law is inadmissible.” Id. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i). 
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sought to remove him and served him with a document labeled 
“Notice to Appear” on October 17, 2013. This document 
specified the allegations against Petitioner and identified the 
legal authority for the removal proceedings against him, but it 
provided for a hearing “on a date to be set at a time to be set.” 
App. 837. On November 13, 2013, Petitioner was served a 
notice of hearing, specifying the time and place of his removal 
proceedings. At a preliminary hearing before an Immigration 
Judge, Petitioner admitted to unlawfully entering the United 
States, conceded he was removable, and sought discretionary 
relief in the form of cancellation of removal, or alternatively, 
voluntary departure. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(b), 1229c.  
 
On January 9, 2017, the Immigration Judge held a 
hearing on the merits of Petitioner’s cancellation of removal 
application. During this hearing, Petitioner admitted to paying 
a total of $8,000 to an individual to help his brother and three 
daughters unlawfully enter the United States in 2015 and 2016 
respectively––years after he was initially served with a notice 
to appear. 6 Because he admitted to helping his family enter the 
United States without permission, the Immigration Judge 
determined Petitioner had engaged in alien smuggling and was 
not a person of good moral character as defined in the INA. See 
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f)(3), 1182(a)(6)(E). As a result, the 
                                              
6  At oral argument, we asked Petitioner’s counsel about a 
discrepancy in the record concerning when Petitioner’s brother 
arrived in the United States. See Tr. of Oral Arg. at 3:20–5:8. 
Petitioner’s counsel thereafter submitted a letter to the Court, 
pointing to record evidence that Petitioner’s brother arrived in 
2015––after Petitioner was served with a notice to appear. The 
Government has not disputed this.   
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Immigration Judge concluded Petitioner was ineligible for 
cancellation of removal. See id. § 1229b(b)(1)(B).  
 
Petitioner appealed this decision to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals. He did not dispute engaging in 
prohibited conduct. He argued, instead, that events occurring 
after the service of a notice to appear could not be used to 
evaluate his good moral character because the stop-time rule, 
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1), applied to the good moral character 
requirement, id. § 1229b(b)(1)(B).  
 
After Pereira, it is evident that the incomplete October 
13, 2013 notice did not trigger the stop-time rule. For purposes 
of Mejia’s petition, we assume the subsequent November 13, 
2013 notice of hearing triggered the stop-time rule because it 
provided the minimum information—hearing time and place—
needed to facilitate Petitioner’s appearance at his removal 
proceeding. Because we conclude the stop-time rule does not 
apply to the good moral character period, we have no occasion 
to decide whether this two-step notice process satisfies § 
1229(a).  
 
Petitioner’s alien smuggling transgressions occurred in 
2015 and 2016. Both incidents, therefore, followed the 
November 13, 2013 notice of hearing. If this notice triggers the 
stop-time rule, as we assume it does for purposes of evaluating 
Petitioner’s contention, then under his theory the alien 
smuggling incidents would fall outside the good moral 
character ten-year window. Under this understanding, 
Petitioner remained a person of good moral character, eligible 
for cancellation of removal. 
 
B. 
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  Relying on its prior published decision, In re Ortega-
Cabrera, 23 I. & N. Dec. 793, 796–97 (B.I.A. 2005), the Board 
rejected Petitioner’s interpretation of the stop-time rule and 
denied his appeal. Ortega-Cabrera explained that, prior to 
IIRIRA’s 1996 amendments to the INA, the Board had 
understood the physical presence and good moral character 
time periods to be identical and to “continu[e] to accrue 
through the time [the Board] decided an alien’s appeal.” Id. at 
794. But the stop-time rule, explained Ortega-Cabrera, 
“altered the calculation” of the physical presence time period 
“by halting the accrual of such presence with the service of the 
[notice to appear].” Id. at 795. The Board concluded that the 
interaction between the stop-time rule and the good moral 
character requirement was ambiguous. See id. 
 
In light of the stop-time rule, Ortega-Cabrera said there 
were “three possible interpretations” of the good moral 
character requirement’s time period. Id. First, the Board could 
continue to treat the physical presence and good moral 
character time period as identical, applying the stop-time rule 
to make both requirements “bounded at the end” by the service 
of a notice to appear. Id. Second, the periods could be identical 
but end instead on “the date that the application for cancellation 
of removal is first filed with the court.” Id. And third, the two 
periods could diverge. Under this final reading, the good moral 
character period would be the ten years prior to the Board’s 
final administrative decision—in other words, the good moral 
character period would be read “consistent with [the Board’s] 
long-established practice” of allowing the good moral 
character time period to accrue until a final administrative 
decision. Id.      
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After acknowledging that each interpretation presented 
problems, Ortega-Cabrera adopted the final option, 
concluding it most aligned with congressional intent. The first 
interpretation––applying the stop-time rule to the good moral 
character requirement––would undermine the INA’s definition 
of good moral character, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f), because this 
reading would allow “an alien who engages in a disqualifying 
act,” such as alien smuggling or giving false testimony at his 
immigration hearing, to remain eligible for cancellation of 
removal if the act occurred after the service of a notice to 
appear. See Ortega-Cabrera, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 797. The 
second option––although appearing consistent with the 
statute’s text––“is thrown into considerable doubt” when read 
with the stop-time rule because that rule had made the phrase 
“immediately preceding the date of the application” 
inapplicable in determining the physical presence requirement. 
Id. at 795.  
 
The final option, in contrast, did not undermine the 
INA’s definition of good moral character, nor did it alter the 
Board’s “well-established practice of treating the application 
as a continuing one for the purposes of assessing an alien’s 
good moral character.” Id. at 797. Finding “no indication that 
Congress, in creating the ‘stop-time’ rule, intended to alter 
th[is] well-established practice,” id., Ortega-Cabrera adopted 
this final interpretation. It held that “an application for 
cancellation of removal remains a continuing one for purposes 
of evaluating an alien’s moral character, and . . . the 10-year 
period during which good moral character must be established 
ends with the entry of a final administrative decision.” Id. at 
798. 
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Petitioner sought review of the Board’s decision before 
this Court.  
 
III. 
The Board had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15.7 We have jurisdiction under 8 
                                              
7  In supplemental briefing Petitioner argues the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Pereira strips the Immigration Court’s (and 
the Board’s) jurisdiction to adjudicate the underlying removal 
proceedings. From Pereira’s observation that “a notice that 
does not specify when and where to appear for a removal 
proceedings is not a ‘notice to appear’ that triggers the stop-
time rule,” Petitioner infers that service of an incomplete notice 
to appear divests the Immigration Judge of jurisdiction. 138 S. 
Ct. at 2115. Our recent decision in Nkomo v. Attorney General, 
___ F.3d____, 2019 WL 3048577 (3d Cir. July 12, 2019), 
rejected Petitioner’s understanding of Pereira and thus 
forecloses his jurisdictional challenge. In Nkomo we joined 
seven courts of appeals to conclude Pereira’s explanation of 
“notice to appear” does not implicate an immigration judge’s 
authority to adjudicate. Nkomo, 2019 WL 3048577, at *2; 
accord Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956, 957–58, 962–64 
(7th Cir. 2019); Ali v. Barr, 924 F.3d 983, 986 (8th Cir. 2019); 
Banegas Gomez v. Barr, 922 F.3d 101, 110–12 (2d Cir. 2019); 
Soriano-Mendosa v. Barr, 786 F. App’x 796, 801–02 (10th 
Cir. 2019); Santos-Santos v. Barr, 917 F.3d 486, 489–91 (6th 
Cir. 2019); Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1160–61 
(9th Cir. 2019); Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 305, 
314–15 (6th Cir. 2018); Leonard v. Whitaker, 746 F. App’x 
269, 269–70 (4th Cir. 2018) (per curiam); United States v. 
Perez-Arellano, 756 F. App’x. 291, 294 (4th Cir. 2018) (per 
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U.S.C. § 1252(a). Although the INA strips us of jurisdiction 
over “any judgment regarding the granting of relief under 
section . . . 1229b [(cancellation of removal)],” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), “we have interpreted this provision to apply 
only with respect to discretionary aspects of the denial of 
cancellation of removal.” Singh v. Att’y Gen., 807 F.3d 547, 
549 n.3 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Mendez-Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 
338 F.3d 176, 178 (3d Cir. 2003)). Whether the stop-time rule 
applies to the good moral character requirement is not a 
“discretionary aspect” of a cancellation of removal application. 
Rather, it is a question of law which is exempt from 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s jurisdiction limitation. See 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(D) (“Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any 
other provision of this chapter . . . which limits or eliminates 
judicial review, shall be construed as precluding review of 
constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition 
for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in 
accordance with this section.”).   
 
IV. 
As we set forth below, the good moral character 
provision timeframe is ambiguous because its text is 
                                              
curiam); see also Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. 
441, 441–45 (B.I.A. 2018). The jurisdiction-vesting regulation 
departs from the statutory stop-time rule, we reasoned, because 
it “does not cross-reference” § 1229(a)’s notice to appear. 
Nkomo, 2019 WL 3048577, at *3. Pereira spoke to a narrow 
issue and did not hint at the sweeping consequences Petitioner 
envisions. We therefore reject his jurisdictional challenge. 
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susceptible to two reasonable interpretations.8 The legal 
question here therefore “implicat[es] an agency’s construction 
of the statute which it administers,” so we “appl[y] the 
principles of deference described in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 
(1984).” I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999) 
(quotation marks omitted).9 “Under Chevron, we take a two-
step approach, first deciding whether the statutory provision 
interpreted by the [Board] is ambiguous and then, if it is, giving 
deference to the [Board]’s reasonable interpretation of the 
INA.” Mondragon-Gonzalez v. Att’y Gen., 884 F.3d 155, 158 
(3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). IIRIRA’s 1996 amendments 
to the INA––in particular, the stop-time rule––rendered the 
applicable timing of the good moral character provision 
                                              
8  We cannot agree with the Dissent’s view that the 
timeframe is unambiguous because it reads the good moral 
character provision in isolation, ignoring the statutory context. 
See infra section IV.A. 
9  “It is clear that principles of Chevron deference are 
applicable to this statutory scheme” because the “INA provides 
that ‘[t]he Attorney General shall be charged with the 
administration and enforcement’ of the statute and that the 
‘determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect 
to all questions of law shall be controlling.’” I.N.S. v. Aguirre-
Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1103(a)(1)). Additionally, the Supreme Court has 
“recognized that judicial deference to the Executive Branch is 
especially appropriate in the immigration context where 
officials ‘exercise especially sensitive political functions that 
implicate questions of foreign relations.’” Id. at 425 (quoting 
I.N.S. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)). 
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ambiguous. And we defer to the Board’s reasonable 
interpretation of the statute. 
 
A. 
 As we have noted, the good moral character time period, 
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B), is ambiguous because its text is 
susceptible to two reasonable interpretations.   
 
Read in isolation, the question presented here initially 
appears straightforward. The statute provides that an alien is 
eligible for cancellation of removal if, inter alia, he “has been 
physically present in the United States for a continuous period 
of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of 
such application” and “has been a person of good moral 
character during such period.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (emphasis 
added). How does one calculate the time period for measuring 
good moral character? Petitioner argues this period is the same 
as the physical presence requirement, i.e., the ten-year period 
“immediately preceding the date of such application,” because 
the phrase “during such period” refers directly to the 
antecedent language. Indeed, prior to the 1996 amendments, 
the Board read an earlier, similar version of the statute as 
treating the two periods as identical.10 It interpreted “such 
                                              
10  The pre-1996 language provided that an alien was 
eligible for suspension of deportation if, inter alia, the alien 
had been “physically present in the United States for a 
continuous period of not less than seven years immediately 
preceding the date of such application,” and “proves that 
during all of such period he was and is a person of good moral 
character.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994) (repealed).  
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application” to be “a continuing one,” allowing the time 
periods to accrue until the Board’s final administrative 
decision on an application for cancellation of removal. Ortega-
Cabrera, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 794; see supra note 10. 
 
But we cannot read the statute in isolation.11 Instead, we 
must “bear[ ] in mind the fundamental canon of statutory 
                                              
We do not believe Congress intended to alter the good 
moral character time period when it changed the phrasing of 
the statute from “during all of such period he was and is a 
person of good moral character,” id. (emphasis added) to “has 
been a person of good moral character during such period,” id. 
§ 1229b(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). “Has been” is the present 
perfect tense, denoting “an act, state, or condition that is now 
completed or continues up to the present.” Chicago Manual of 
Style § 5.132, at 268 (17th ed. 2017). It is used to refer either 
to time in the indefinite past, or past action that continues until 
the present. Id. 
11  As our dissenting colleague correctly observes, § 
1229b(b)(1)(A) and (B) are clear when read in isolation. See 
Dissenting Op. at 1–2. If these provisions alone spelled out the 
requirements for cancellation of removal, we would resolve 
this case without deferring to the Board’s interpretation. 
Section 1229b(b)(1)(A) and (B), in isolation, provide that both 
the continuous physical presence and good moral character 
periods end with the final administrative decision. But this 
reading is at odds with the later added stop-time rule. See 8 
U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (“For purposes of this section, any period 
of continuous residence or continuous physical presence in the 
United States shall be deemed to end . . . when the alien is 
served a notice to appear under section 1229(a) . . . .”). What 
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construction that the words of a statute must be read in their 
context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory 
scheme.” King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015) 
(quotation marks omitted); see also F.D.A. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (“In 
determining whether Congress has specifically addressed the 
question at issue, a reviewing court should not confine itself to 
examining a particular statutory provision in isolation. The 
meaning––or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may 
only become evident when placed in context.”). When read in 
context with the stop-time rule, § 1229b(b)(1)(B)’s language is 
susceptible to two different interpretations. See Rodriguez-
Avalos v. Holder, 788 F.3d 444, 453 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e 
agree with the [the Board] and the Seventh Circuit that the 
‘interplay of the statutory language at issue here is ambiguous 
and subject to multiple possible interpretations.”); Duron-Ortiz 
v. Holder, 698 F.3d 523, 527 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The ambiguity 
arises when we read the statute in conjunction with the stop-
time provision of § 1229b(d)(1).”); cf. Moscoso-Castellanos v. 
Lynch, 803 F.3d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Because the 
statute is susceptible to several interpretations, we hold, at 
Chevron step one, that the statute is ambiguous.”).  
 
1. 
Under the interpretation advanced by Petitioner, the 
stop-time rule applies to both the physical presence and the 
good moral character time periods––closing both windows 
when a notice to appear is served.  
 
                                              
is unambiguous in isolation, therefore, becomes ambiguous 
when read alongside other relevant provisions. 
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Recall that the stop-time rule provides that “any period” 
of “continuous physical presence . . . shall be deemed to end 
when the alien is served a notice to appear.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(d)(1). The good moral character requirement refers 
directly to the “period” of physical presence. See 8 U.S.C. § 
1229b(b) (requiring that the alien “has been a person of good 
moral character during such period”). By tethering its 
timeframe to the continuous physical presence period, the good 
moral character requirement incorporates the stop-time rule’s 
limitation. Read so, the good moral character and physical 
presence time period would be identical, each terminating with 
the service of a notice to appear that meets the requirements of 
§ 1229(a)(1). 
 
2. 
But this is not the only reasonable interpretation. 
Alternatively, IIRIRA’s 1996 amendments to the INA could be 
read as having no effect on the good moral character time 
period. Indeed, the stop-time rule’s language does not mention 
good moral character. IIRIRA created the stop-time rule in a 
separate subsection, titled “Special rules relating to continuous 
residence or physical presence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d). And the 
rule only provides that an alien’s “continuous residence or 
continuous physical presence . . . shall be deemed to end when 
the alien is served a notice to appear.” Id. § 1229b(d)(1). 
Nothing in the stop-time rule’s text indicates it should apply 
beyond the continuous physical presence requirement to 
circumscribe the good moral character time period. The 
Dissent does not consider this construction, as it focuses 
exclusively on the language of § 1229b(b)(1)(A) and (B). But 
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the plain language of § 1229b(d)(1) casts doubt on whether the 
Dissent’s interpretation is the only reasonable one.12 
 
Under this second interpretation, the good moral 
character requirement would be the “10 years immediately 
preceding the date of such application.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(b)(1)(A). In keeping with the prior understanding of 
the phrase “such application,” this period would run through 
the Board’s final administrative decision on the alien’s 
cancellation of removal application.13  
                                              
12  We believe the Dissent’s position reinforces the 
ambiguity. The Dissent acknowledges the perplexity of its 
plain reading: “A decision that the stop-time rule for both 
physical presence and good moral character is 10 years before 
the application is a windfall for an applicant like Mejia-
Castanon, for the acts in this case . . . .” Dissenting Op. at 1 
(emphasis added). Not so. Aliens profit from the scheme only 
if the good moral character period ends upon service of a notice 
to appear, the position advanced by Petitioner. But nothing in 
the text of § 1229b(b)(1)(A) or (B) supports such a reading 
because neither provision’s timeframe, in isolation, is tied to 
service of a notice to appear. Thus we must interpret the 
interplay between § 1229b(b)(1)(A)–(B) and § 1229b(d)(1), 
which necessarily invites ambiguity. 
13  In In re Ortega-Cabrera, 23 I. & N. Dec. 793, 796–97 
(B.I.A. 2005), the Board also suggested a third potential 
interpretation: “[The good moral character time period] may be 
the 10-year period ending on the date that the application for 
cancellation of removal is first filed with the court.” Id. at 795. 
We disagree.  
As explained in Ortega-Cabrera, prior to the IIRIRA’s 
1996 amendments to the INA, the Board had interpreted “such 
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Because § 1229b(b)(1)(B)’s text––when read in context 
with the stop-time rule–– is susceptible to two reasonable 
interpretations, it is ambiguous at step one of Chevron.  
 
B. 
 Under Chevron’s second step, we “may not substitute 
[our] own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable 
                                              
application” to be “a continuing one,” allowing the time 
periods to accrue until the Board’s final administrative 
decision on an application for cancellation of removal. 23 I. & 
N. Dec. at 794. We presume Congress is aware of an 
administrative interpretation of a statute and that it adopts that 
interpretation when it reenacts the statute in materially similar 
language. See Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 138 S. 
Ct. 1752, 1762 (2018) (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 
645 (1998)) (“When administrative and judicial interpretations 
have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, 
repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a 
general matter, the intent to incorporate its administrative and 
judicial interpretations as well.”); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 
575, 580 (1978) (“Congress is presumed to be aware of an 
administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to 
adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without 
change.”).  
Had Congress enacted § 1229b(b)’s “immediately 
preceding the date of such application” language on a clean 
slate, it would seem obvious that the best reading of the statute 
would be its literal one. But because Congress used the same 
language in § 1229b(b) as it did in § 1254(d), it was 
presumptively aware of the Board’s longstanding (albeit 
nonliteral) interpretation of the phrase “such application.”   
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interpretation made by the” Board. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
When reviewing the Board’s interpretation, “we do not ask 
whether it is the best possible interpretation of Congress’s 
ambiguous language. Instead, we extend considerable 
deference to the agency and inquire only whether it made ‘a 
reasonable policy choice’ in reaching its interpretation.” Am. 
Farm Bureau Fed’n v. E.P.A., 792 F.3d 281, 295 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 986 (2005)). Because the Board’s 
interpretation is both a reasonable reading of the text and a 
reasonable policy choice, we join our sister circuits in 
concluding that its decision in Ortega-Cabrera is entitled to 
Chevron deference. See Rodriguez-Avalos v. Holder, 788 F.3d 
444, 455 (5th Cir. 2015); Duron-Ortiz, 698 F.3d at 528.  
 
 First, the Board’s interpretation––declining to apply the 
stop-time rule to the good moral character time period and 
concluding that the period accrues through a final 
administrative decision––is a reasonable understanding of the 
statute’s text. At a minimum, it embodies “a permissible 
construction of the statute.” Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424 
(citation and quotation marks omitted). As explained above, it 
is reasonable to interpret the stop-time rule to have no effect on 
the good moral character time period, as the stop-time rule’s 
text never mentions good moral character. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(d).  
 
 Second, the Board’s interpretation is “a reasonable 
policy choice,” Brand X, 545 U.S. at 986, because it comports 
with congressional intent and avoids results inconsistent with 
the broader purpose of the INA.  
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 The Board’s interpretation is consistent with 
congressional intent. Congress created the stop-time rule to 
eliminate the incentive to delay immigration proceedings in 
order to accrue physical presence time. See Rios-Pineda, 471 
U.S. at 450 (explaining the “substantial incentive” for aliens 
facing deportation “to prolong litigation” in order to “stall[ ] 
physical departure in the hope of satisfying” the seven-year 
requirement); see also H.R. Rep. 104-469, at 122 (1996) 
(explaining that aliens were exploiting suspension of 
deportation by seeking to “accrue time toward the seven year 
threshold even after they ha[d] been placed in deportation 
proceedings”). There was not, however, a similar incentive 
related to accruing good moral character time. See Ortega-
Cabrera, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 797 (explaining there was “no 
indication that Congress, in creating the ‘stop-time’ rule, 
intended to alter” the Board’s “well-established practice” of 
treating the good moral character time period as accruing until 
its final administrative decision). And Petitioner identifies no 
evidence Congress sought to alter the good moral character 
time period.  
 
 Finally, the Board’s interpretation avoids results 
inconsistent with the broader purpose of the INA. Under 
Petitioner’s interpretation, an alien could engage in a 
disqualifying act––like alien smuggling or testifying falsely at 
an immigration hearing—and yet remain eligible for 
cancellation of removal, so long as the act occurred after the 
service of a Pereira-compliant notice to appear. See Ortega-
Cabrera, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 797. Good moral character, 
however, involves “one of the most essential considerations in 
deciding who is allowed to remain in the United States––an 
individual’s character.” Duron-Ortiz, 698 F.3d at 528. “It is 
only logical that the agency consider an applicant’s most recent 
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negative behavior when making such a decision, as the more 
recent an individual’s behavior is, the more accurately it 
reflects his or her character.” Id. This choice is wholly 
reasonable.  
 
V. 
The Board’s interpretation of the good moral character 
time period is entitled to Chevron deference. Under that 
reasonable interpretation, the stop-time rule does not apply to 
the good moral character requirement. Rather, events occurring 
in the ten-year period prior to the final administrative decision 
on the alien’s application for cancellation of removal are 
subject to the good moral character requirement. We will 
therefore deny the petition.  
  
 SILER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, 
because I do not find ambiguity in the statute involved.  
Because there is no ambiguity in the statute, we should not give 
deference to the Board in its interpretation of the INA.  See 
Mondragon-Gonzalez v. Att’y Gen., 884 F.3d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 
2018).  The Board concludes that the stop-time rule applies to 
the physical presence of not less than 10 years immediately 
preceding the date of the application for cancellation of 
removal but does not apply to the petitioner’s requirement of 
being a person of good moral character during the same 
continuous 10-year period.  That conclusion follows logic but 
it does not follow the statute.  A decision that the stop-time rule 
for both physical presence and good moral character is 10 years 
before the application is a windfall for an applicant like Mejia-
Castanon, for the acts in this case which would preclude him 
from being eligible for a cancellation of removal would allow 
him to “beat the system.” 
 
However, the plain language of the statute provides 
otherwise, and Congress has had an opportunity to amend the 
statute, as recited in the majority opinion.  Thus, the current 
statute reads: 
 
The Attorney General may cancel removal of . . 
. an alien who is inadmissible or deportable . . . 
if the alien-- 
 
 (A) has been physically present in the 
United States for a continuous period of 
not less than 10 years immediately 
Case No. 17-2901 
Pablo Mejia-Castanon v. Attorney General of the United States 
of America 
2 
 
preceding the date of such application; 
[and] 
 
(B) has been a person of good moral 
character during such period . . . . 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A)-(B). 
 I realize, as the majority indicates, that two other 
circuits have ruled otherwise.  See Rodriguez-Avalos v. Holder, 
788 F.3d 444, 453 (5th Cir. 2015); Duron-Ortiz v. Holder, 698 
F.3d 523, 527 (7th Cir. 2012).  The Board ruled likewise.  See 
In re Ortega-Cabrera, 23 I. & N. Dec. 793, 796-97 (B.I.A. 
2005).  However, in reading the plain language of the statute, I 
cannot agree.  Therefore, I would grant the petition for review. 
